The average effect of social programs on outcomes such as earnings is a parameter of primary interest in econometric evaluations studies. New results on using exclusion restrictions to identify and estimate average treatment effects are presented.
tion presents some very general findings regarding the ideitification of distributions, but devotes relatively little attention to couvertiog theoretical identification into empirically feasible estimators. In contrast, the formulation in this paper focuses on conditional means, and is immediately useful to applied researchers because it provides necessary and sufficient conditions for linear instrumental variables techniques to consistently estimatc [lie a.veragc effect of treatment, In this, our approach is related to Angrist's (1991) use of instrumental variables to estimate treatment effects in nonlinear models, although here the identification conditions are not motivated by functional form restrictions.
We also show how to interpret the identifying assumptions as outlining a particular type of experimental design useful for research involving li,irnan subjects. Like Tlcckman (19911b), 2 • we view social experiments as a source of identifying information, rather than as a replacemerit for economic modelling, and think that experiments should be designcd with this in mini An experimental design interpretation of instrumental Variables identification conditions is important because the resulting design may be ethically more attractive titan the conventional approach to randomization wherein eligible program applicants are randomly excluded from treatment. For example, some physicians have argued that randomization is incompatible with the Personal Care Principle in medical ethics, which requires doctors to put the welfare of their patients ahove the potential social gains from research (Royall [1991] ). JPTA program administrators are also reluctant to deny training to applicants randomized into a control group (Hotz [1991] ).
Our framework for experimental design essentially consists of first choosing an eligible population or evaluation site, either by randomized manipulation, or on the basis of ignorahie (as defined by Rosenhaum and Robin [1983] ) covariates. Any eligible participant is then allowed to participate in the program if he or site likes-This approach may also identify • parameters which are more likely to be useful for forecasting the impact of future programs-5
As a related by-product, our approach to inference also provides some insight regarding the problem of non-compliance in clinical trials, recently analyzed by Efron end Feldman (1991) and Robins (1989) . Randomization of intention--to-treat, but not actual treatment, 5Harris (1985) and Moult (199Th) also discuss randomization of ales verses esodoniisatioo of isdividuak However, a key distinctioe is that within sites these aothors argue for saturation of treatment withis sites while we do net. Different average treatmrnt effects see therefore idei,tilled is the two types of siterandomization designs.
3 is one way to generate excLusion restrictions that will be sufficient to identify an average treatment effect. Not surprisingly, the estimator that uses these exclusion restrictions is a form of instrumental variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally defines the average effect of treatment on prugram participants and presents the main theoretical results. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for a data generating prucess to identify an average treatment effect under exclusion restrictioos. These results are also compared to previous results on the identification of treatment effects. Section 3 outlines the instrument-al variables interpretation of identifying information and discusses the type of experimental design or data generating processes tisat satisfy the identifying conditions. Some results on the efficient use of exclesiun restrictions in estimating average treatment effects are also discussed. In section 4 we discuss what can he learned about treatment effects if the average treatment effect of interest is not identified. It is shown that one might still he able to derive hounds for the average treatment effect. Section 5 offers a summary and some cencluding thouglsts on the nature of identifying information in models for the evaluation of social programs.
An important distinction, and an underlying theme of the paper, is tlse difference betwn identifying information derived from models of prograsn participants' beliavinc and from information about program eligibility rules. We argue thai. the latter is more lilse!y to provide a convincing empirical identification strategy.
2.1 IDENTIFJCATON. Our framework is essentially similar to that advanced by Ruhin (1977 ), 4 -}Jeckman (1990 , and others. Let }'0 be the response variable for an individual if lie or she does not participate in the program. We assume that Y5 is well defined even if the individual is actually participating in the program. Similarly, Y5 is the value of the response variable if the individual does participate in the program, and 1's -1's is the treatment effect that we are interested in. We never ohserve both Y5 and Yi; all inferences about these differences are indirect and in terms of expectations. Let fs(y) and fs(p) denote the probability density functions of Y0 and 1' respectively. P denotes an indicator for program participation, equal to one if an individual participates in the program, and equal to zero otlserwise.
The average treatment effect can be defined in a number of ways (See, e.g., Heckman and Rnhb [19851, and Heckman [19901) . First, there is the cxpcctation of Y -Y0 in the population:
(1) &=EI1i-Ys)fy[fs(y)_fo(y)]d This is the expected treatment effect if we take an individual randomly from the population and look at the difference between his response as a participant and nonparticipant. .& second average treatment effect is defined by taking the expectation conditional on participation:
This srieasures how much a participant gains from the program. Whether the focus is on the average treatment effect (ATE), Es, or on the selected averagc treatment effect (SATE), ce depends on the particular application. We are.nsually interested in forecasting the effects of a program when it is extended tu a larger part of society. If the program or treatment will potentially be used by all members of the population, & is appropriate. If the program will eventually be used by a population with characteristics similar to (lie population in the evaluation design, a is the relevant average treatment effect. The latter is probably more realistic in economic applications. We will therefore concentrate on iden ti licatiun of cs, rather
The problem of estimating average treatment effects in our framework is one of sample selection exactly the same as that considered by Gronau (1974) , Heckman (1979) Ji(yIP=1) and fe(vIP=0), along with the probability of participation, q = Pr(P = 1). These distributions do not allow us to calculate & or a, for which we need to know the cousiterfactnal expectation EI}'IP = 1],
The difference between the meen of Y1 for those who participate and Pb for those who do not participate can be written as
The average difference in outcomes between program participants saul nonpartir.ipants geecrahly confoonds the treatment effect a and the selection effect /3. The exceptino is when 6 • fiIP 1) is equal to f(y4P = 0) for i = 0,1 and all y, in which case selection is sometimes said to be ignorable. This implies that the two response distributions (with and without participation) do not depend on the decision to participate. If this is not the case then selection is non-ignorable and it is clear that we need more information, or restrictions on fo(), to separate a and ft. Below, we briefly review some identifying assumptions.
The first approach assumes that the selection problem can be solved simply by conditioning on the right covariates.
Condition 1 There is en observable couariatc X such that
In this case we can condition on)( to remove the selection effect if we observe (1', F, X):
This is in terms of expectations and distributions that can usually be estimated. The selection effect is equal to;
which can also be estimated. Ifg(zP 1) = g(xP = 0) for all x, implying that Pr(E = ljx)
does not depend on x, selection is ignorable alter all and the selection effect is zero.
Conditioning on covariates corresponds to identification by adequately controlling for all factors related to both outcomes and treatment. References for this approach include Rubin (1977) and, in a regression framework, Barnow, Cain, and Coldherger (1981) . A generalized control function methodology is outlined by Heckman and }t.obb (1985) . An alternative approach to evaluation restricts the manner in which treatment is assigned. For example, treatment may be randomly assigned. In an experimental context, the distinction between approaches to causal inference based on control and randomization dates back at least to Fisher (1935) . The econometric approach to restricting the manner of treatment assignment is to impose an exclusion restriction Condition 2 There is a random variable Z such thai fur all z
and E[PZ = z] is e non trivial function of z Tbe covariate Z aFfects the participation probability, hut is nct related to tbe expected response in the ahseeee of treatment.
Exclusion restrictions are widely used in econometrics, usually in conjunction with other identifying restriction. One of tise most influential approaches is that developed in a series 8 of papers by Heckman (1976 Heckman ( , 1979 . The following example is a simplification of the model used by 1-Ieckman (1979):
The conditional expectation of }, given Z = z is EIY5IZ= z]=p+E(cIZ=zj=p and since participation depends on both Z and U, it satisfies Condition 2. Notice that the treatment effect a in (3) is identical for every subject, so it is equal to the average and selected average treatment effects.
Another example is Angrist's (1991) nonlinear model with an omitted variable, U, that is correlated with F, but independent of an excluded instrument Z:
and Z and U independenL Angrist shows that the average treatment effect
is identified U and only if F or G is additively separable. In most of the sconometric literature identification is based on distributional assumptions, functional form assumptions regarding either the conditional expectation of the response function and the probability of participation, or both. In our main result, we investigate when the exclusion restriction outlined in condition 2 is sufficient to identify the average treatment effect. Our approach is to invoke easily verifiable restrictions on the value of L(.r, u) and the distribution of Z.
Condition 3 There is a set Ze such that 1 > Fr(Z E Z5) > 0, Pr(P = 12 = 4 = 0 for all z E Zo.
Theorem I Condiiions 2 and S are sufficieat for identification of a with a random semple of(Y,Z,P).
Proof; Let A be an indicator for the event Z Z'. Then:
Since we can consistently estimate Pr
QED.
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The theorem above shows that it is sufficient for identification to have a value1 or set of values, 4, which is realised with non-zero probability and for which the prohability of participation is zero. The question arises whether this is a necessary as well as a sufficient condition A complete answer is difficult to give. But, a number of related results suggest that it is almost impossible to achieve identification otherwise. First we note that the key to identifying a is the identification of E[Ys]:
Result 1 a is identified if end only q E[Y0] is sdentifled.
Proof: By definition a = E[Y1IP 11-E[Y0)P = I]. Note that EIIP I] is identified because we observe 1' if P = 1. Therefore identification of a is equivalent to identification of
Second, we show that if Z is a discrete random variable, Condition 3 is indeed necessary for identification of E[Y5] and therefore for identification of a:
Result 2 Suppose Z is a discrete reudom variable with K posrsls of ssspport. if Pr(P = = zs) > 0 for eli k, then E[Y5] is not identified without edditional restrictions.
Proof: We can identify from the sampling design, for k = 1,,. ,K,
There are K equations in K + I unknowns. Therefore we cannot identify E[Y] without some restriction on -YsZ = zkj if Jr(P 14Z z5} > 0 for all 4. Note that one restriction such aS equality of the conditional difference E[Yi -Y5Z = at) for k and k is sufficient for
QtD.
The reasos that Results 1 and 2 do not constitute a complete argument for sufficiency is that if Zis not discrete, it might be possible to identify E[Y0) in certain limiting cases, even when Condition 3 fails. In fact, this sort of "identification at infisuty" is an underlying theme of a number of previous results on the identification of treatment effects.
COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS IDENTIFICATION RESULTS. Conditions 2 and 3 and
Theorem 1 are related to seIne recent results on semi-parametric identification. In latent index models like (3)-(5), if the disturbances are normal then there is clearly no set Zo such that the participatioo probability is zero for that set. This implios that we cannot estimate EfY5I = E[YIA 0], the expected response for those who had zero probability of participating, sn that identification cannot he based on Theorem 1. However, one might.
be able to estimate E[1' in the limit. One such approach is Condition B in lleckman's (1900) theorem on nnsparametric identification of treatment effects in a latent-index sample selection niode.l. Jieckrnan requires the support of7 Z in the latent index to be the real line.
Therefore, there is a sequence of sets 2 such that the probability of participating gues to zero in the limit. That is, there is a sequcnce of sets Z, such that fur all sequences of real Although the economic theory of discrete choice is well-developed and generally accepted, the details of empirical implementation are not. Identification at infinity requires not only covariates shifting choices hut exchsded from outcomes, hut also a covariate-choice relation.
ship that oheys additional restrictions without intrinsic behavioral or iustitutional content.
Both our Theorem 1 and previous results rely on exclusion restrictions and restrictions on the probability of participating for certain grout's. Therefore, identification under Theorem I is similar to identification under the results of Chamberlain (1986) and }leckman (1990).
One essential feature, however, distinguishes our s.pproach from the traditional econometric viewpoint; In Theorem 1, the main source of identifying information -the set of covariates for whom the probability of participation is scro is obtained from the knowledge that the program was simply not offered to certain individuals or groups. A latent index framework in this esso is unnnatoral and unnecessary; with this sort of prior information there is no need to rely on limiting behavior.6
Secondly, we note that Manski (1990) presents sisnilar results regarding identification of density functions in selection models without refereoce to a latent index framework, Manski's Corollary 2 (p. 30) shows that given certain level-set restrictions, nonparametric bounds on density functions coincide, and therefore the density function is identified, if and only if the probability of selection is one for some part of the population. Like Beckman and Chamberlain, however Manski (p. 30) seems to feel that ideotifying with level-set restrictions is "rarely identifying in practice." Part of the reason for this is that while the results by Manski and Beckman give identification in principle, Chamherlain proves that the information bound can be zero for these models. Our approach requires that Pr(Z 6 2) > 0, which unplies that the treatment effect is estimable at rate 1W. Identification of the local average treatment effect does not requiro the existence of a group 6The argumest we make fur identifying information fron program eligibility rules is sicnilar to tbat made inlormally in a recent paper by MolfiL (1991).
14 with zero participation probability. However, the exclusion restriction must be strengthened anti requires that both Y and }' are independent of Z. In addition the relation between the instrument and participation is restricte& The result in Theorem I shows that the existence of an ineligible group directly reduces the need for untestable conditions for identification of a meaningful average treatment effect.
Recent empirical examples of evaluations in this framework include the geographically randomized Educational Assistance Test Program (EAT?) and Multiple Option Recruiting
Experiment (MORE), in which different packages of veterans educational benefits were randornized over military recruitment stations (Fernandez [1982] As in most econometric applications, the examples listed above were implemented using statjstical models with a constant treatment effect, so that the exclusion restrictions alone are sufficient for identification. But selected average treatment effects may also be identified in some o these cases. For example, in the compulsory schooling application, virtually all 15 stndents born in certain quarters were compelled to complete an additional year of schooling.
Other students chose whether or not to continue in school; the treatment in this case is failure to complete art additional year of schooling. Likewise, in the Vietnam-era draft lottery, virtually all non-deferred meo with low lottery numbers were drafted.7
2.3 IDENTIFiCATION OF THE AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT.
If instead of the set 4 we had a set 4 such that Pr(P = liZ = z) = I for all z 4, we would he able to identify the selected average non-treatment effect:
The selected average non-treatment effçct measures how much non-participants gain (or The condition that is required for identification of EYJ -YP = 1] using Theorem 1 is thaL E[1IA = 1) = ELY5IA = 0]. Equation (6) is much stronger than this, but it snakes the identification strategy and the difference between the two types of experiments transparent. 
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The SATE is io this ease the expected treatment effect for all participants if eligibility were to be extended to the entire population, ic. if A = 1 for all individuals,9 The combination of the ineligibles and eligible non-participants allows us to identify the distribution of e for those who are willing to participate;
where
is identified from the proportion of participants among eligibles. One advantage of this type of experiment rather than the randomizing of applicants is that we also observe a mnnher of individuals who do psot wish to participate and therefore we can identify the selection effect fi. Harris (1985) , Garfinkel, Macski and Michalopuulos (1991) and Moflit (1991) refer to experiments based on site randomization as macroexperiments, in contrast to microexperiments in which individuals within a site are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. These authors stress that such macrnexperiments can potentially identity macro lrertment effects that result from interaction between individuals, An important difference 5lJer result differs from that in fleckmaii (1091b, p. 27) because we compare eligibles and ineligibles whereas Heckman compares participants and irsel,giblra.
18 between our approach and previous discussion of macro experiments, however, is that we are not arguing for saturation of treatment within eligible sites.'°A fnrther advantage of an experiment in which eligibility is randomly assigned is tbat there is no formal application process for subjects who will later be randomized out. The need to deny treatment appears to he major factor in the dissatisfaction of job training centers with randomized assigment (Manslci end Garfinkel 1991). Morcoever, iii medical research, eligibility randomization does not require that individual physicians deny a treatnsent they feel is beneficial (as ocurred in the controversial EGMO textracorporeal membrane oxygenation] study of infant mortality; see Royall, [1991] ). Instead of randomizing treatment within hospitals, randomly chosen hospitals could have been selected for study, with physicians freely choosing the most appropriate treatment within eligible sites, and data collected on outcomes at all sites. Another issue of interest in medical research is the question of non-compliance in conventional clinical trials. It is clear that as long as eligibility for treatment ("intention-to-treat" in biometric terminology) is randomized, the effect of a binary treatment on participants is identified using Theorem I. The first estimator is a linear instrumental variables estimator. The variable A is an instrument for the endogennus regressor P because
The sample analog of the solution for a is an estimate of Cov -E{EfPIA]IX} which simplifies to
This implies that X is a valid instrument. It is clear that using both X and A as instrunsents is equivalent to using just A because A' does oot add any information once A is known.
However, X may be useful if A is not observed. En the example of the dralt lottery, one might envision knowing the week a person was born, but not the exae day. In that ease the 21 week is the inaccurate instrument X while the actual day on which a person is born would be the accurate instrument A.
INFERENCE WHEN THE SELECTED AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IS NOT IDENTIFIED.
In this section we discuss what can be learned about treatment effects when Condition 2 is satislied, but not Condition 3. There is no control group of ineligibles, and therefore an essential component of the instrumental variables approach discussed in the previous section is missing. We also assume that 2 is discrete with points of support z5, z,. . . , z.
Let Pxk PjZ] ). This is the optimal instrument when the compound error term is conditionally (on Z) homoskedsstic (Newey [1989) Result 3 The instrumental variables estimator far a using Z as an instrument for P has Giveis a choice rife, the bound is eetimable.
An alternative to bounding the treatment effect heterogeneity is the approach in Imhens and Angrist (1991) whore restrictions on the way in which the instrument Z affects participation is employed to ideotify a local average treatment effect.
5.
Coiccaustorc. The SATE measures tbe average difference between the outcomes of program participants and what participants' outcomes would have been had they not been treated. When some individuals or groupe are ineligible to participate in a program, and eligibility does not affect outcomes for other reasons, the SATE is identified using a simple instrumental variables estimator. This estimator wiil usually be efficiont -it makes full use of the identifying information provided by program eligibility rules.
The possibility of ideotification through eligibility rules is established using the same logic as recent arguments for identification based on the existence of s set of covariates for which the probability of treatment approaches zero in the limit. The source of identifying ''This is an alternative In beunds on the response variable itself, whirl, is analyzed as in the context of selecuou models in Manshi (19911,) Is Angriet and Krueger (1990) A is estimated to be about 25 for tin relation between quarl.er of birth asd high school graduation.
information is different, however, and likely to he more credible than identification through latent index models of individual behavior. Program rules are a matter of public record, and observed data can be used to verify enforcement of the rules. identification through eligibility rules may also provide a good forecast of future program effects under the same roles. Another attractive feature of tins approach is that no eligible participant need be The model does not imply any other restrictions, it is essential to show tlsis before proving efficiency using the Chamberlain bounds The argument goes as follows. Suppose we have a ds.tagenerating process for (Y, Z, P) with P binary satisfying the moment conditions. Then we can always construct a model that satisfies (i) and (2) 
